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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the span of nearly a century and a half, the federal
government granted control of millions of acres of federal land to newly
formed states upon each state entering the Union.1 The terms of these
land grants changed over the course of time, but the underlying purpose
of the grants remained relatively uniform: to support public education.2
These state lands, known as school or state trust lands, are publicly
owned and managed but are not typical public lands in the most
commonly used sense of the term.3 Rather, state school trust lands are
their own breed of public lands. Knowledge of Montana’s unique state
school trust land history is essential to understanding current
management of these important public lands.
This article presents a synopsis of the history and legal principles
of Montana’s school trust lands. Part II discusses the origin of the
federal land grant program, including the variation in the amount of lands
granted and the grant recipients. Part II also discusses how the federal
land grants came to be viewed as imposing a trust relationship between
the receiver of the grants and the grant’s intended beneficiaries. Part III
discusses the unique history of Montana’s school trust lands, including
Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act, Constitution, and statutory scheme
relating to trust lands. Part III further discusses the administration of
school trust lands in Montana and the current status of these lands, with a
brief description of the current market conditions leading to an increase
in commercial development of state trust lands. Part IV focuses on case
law relating to Montana’s school trust lands, including how early courts
*
Jessica Wiles is a Special Assistant Attorney General for the State
of Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation. J.D. 2010, Lewis
and Clark Law School; B.S. 2001 University of Montana. The opinions contained
herein are solely those of the author and do not represent that of any agency or
organization.
1.
In total, Congress gave the states 77,630,000 acres for common
schools, and 21,700,000 to the states for universities, hospitals, asylums, and other
public institutions. See CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE ORIGINAL
FEDERAL LAND GRANT PROGRAM: A BACKGROUND PAPER FROM THE CENTER ON
EDUCATION POLICY 15 (2001) [hereinafter CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY BACKGROUND
PAPER].
2.
In re Powder River Drainage Area, 702 P.2d 948, 952 (Mont. 1985)
(“A major policy of the fledgling nation was to foster public education by grants of
land to newly admitted states for that purpose. Each of the thirty states carved out of
the public domain received such grants, varying in the quantity granted, and terms of
the grant, as national policy and political winds dictated.”).
3.
JON A. SOUDER & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS:
HISTORY, MANAGEMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE USE 285 (1996).
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affirmed the trust relationship, and how case law created through
taxpayer, citizen group, and environmental group challenges has led to
the core legal principles surrounding Montana’s school trust lands.
Finally, Part IV concludes that the management of school trust lands, as
well as the income derived from such lands is, and will remain,
immensely important to Montana.
II. THE ORIGIN OF STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS
Using federal land grants to support public education and public
schools is not a modern concept.4 As history reflects, our nation’s
founders used federal land grants as a way to incorporate the principles
of democracy into the far flung regions of the nation.5 In doing so, this
policy equipped individual citizens with resources to exercise the rights
and responsibilities of a democratic society.6 This policy was first
revealed in the General Land Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787.7 The federal land grants changed over time in terms
of both the amount of lands granted and the entities to which the lands
were granted.8 Ultimately, without an express intention within the grants
themselves, these grants came to be viewed as bestowing a trust
responsibility on the recipient.9 This Part does not fully detail that
history, but rather attempts to summarize the origin of the federal land
grants, focusing on the unique nature of Montana’s specific land grant
story.

4.
GARETH C. MOON, THE HISTORY OF MONTANA STATE FORESTRY: A
COMPROMISE BETWEEN IDEALISM AND ECONOMIC PRACTICALITY 9 (1991); see also
PETER W. CULP, DIANE B. CONRADI & CYNTIA C. TUELL, TRUST LANDS IN THE
AMERICAN WEST: A LEGAL OVERVIEW AND POLICY ASSESSMENT, A POLICY
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY & SONORAN
INSTITUTE JOINT VENTURE ON STATE TRUST LANDS 4–6 (2005).
5.
CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 4.
6.
CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 1, at 2; see
also CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 4–5 (“This theme was adopted with
great fervor by the American revolutionaries, who believed that a well-educated
citizenry would be essential to protect liberty and ensure that the citizens of the
Republic would be prepared to exercise the basic freedoms of religion, press,
assembly, due process of law, and trial by jury.”).
7.
CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 2.
8.
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 18–33.
9.
Id. at 33–36.
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A. Origins of Federal Land Grants for Purposes of Supporting Public
Schools
Two early federal statutes established key federal land
disposition policies and began the large scale systematization of land
grants for purposes of supporting public educational institutions.10 The
first, the General Land Ordinance of 1785, established the rectangular
survey and sale of western land.11 The survey provided for organizing
land into six-by-six mile townships divided into thirty-six sections of one
square mile each, or 640 acres.12 This method of organizing western
land was meant to create a system to facilitate the sale of these lands and
provide for more clarity in the determination of ownership boundaries.13
In addition to the creation of the survey system, the General Land
Ordinance of 1785 introduced the practice of federal land grants for
schools by reserving the section numbered sixteen in every township “for
the maintenance of public schools within the said township.”14
The second key federal statute, the Northwest Ordinance of
1787, provided a system for governing the territories with the goal of
providing territories a path to transition to statehood.15 In short, a region
could be organized by an act of Congress to become a United States
Territory.16 Once a Territory, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 required
that a Territory have a population of 60,000 people to be eligible for
statehood and inclusion into the Union.17 After reaching a population of
60,000, the Territory could then petition Congress for admission into the
Union.18 Congress could then pass an “enabling act” authorizing a

10.
Id. at 18–19; see also CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 6.
11.
An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of Disposing of Lands in
the Western Territory, in 4 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 520, 520–21
(1823); see also CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 6.
12.
See SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 8, 18.
13.
CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 6–7.
14.
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 18.
15.
An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United
States North-West of the River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 (1787) [hereinafter Northwest
Ordinance]; see also CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 5, at 7.
16.
Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. at 51–53.
17.
Id. This requirement was not always enforced. Nevada was
admitted to the Union despite not reaching the required population requirement in
1864 to ensure Lincoln’s Electoral College victory in the national election. See
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 20, 22.
18.
Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. at 51; SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note
3, at 18.

WILES PROOF (Do Not Delete)

9/24/2017 8:03 PM

MONTANA’S STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS

2017

153

constitutional convention in the potential new state.19 If the potential
state’s constitution passed popular referendum in the Territory, Congress
could accept the state’s constitution and the new state would be admitted
to the Union on an equal footing with all others.20 Of key importance to
this discussion, upon joining the Union, each state’s enabling act
provided for the grant of federal lands to the state, the terms of which
differed and evolved over time.21
B. Variation in Amount of Lands Granted: State-by-State Accession
During territorial and statehood negotiations, each state made an
individual land grant deal with the federal government.22 Notably, the
later a state joined the Union, the larger the grant of federal lands that
state received in its enabling act became.23 The original thirteen colonies
19.

Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. at 51; SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note

3, at 18.
20.
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 18.
21.
See CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 7.
22.
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 8, 18–33. Note that states and
territories were also provided other land grants:
The original reservation grants for common schools were also
accompanied by increasingly generous ‘block’ grants for the
support of other public institutions. For example, the 1841
Preemption Act granted five hundred thousand acres of land to
every public land state for a variety of public purposes; later, the
Agricultural College Act of 1862 granted lands to all of the states
that were not in active rebellion against the Union to endow
agricultural and mechanical colleges (when the war ended, this
grant was extended to the southern states as well). Other grant
programs transferred lands to states to finance internal
improvements, such as railroads.
CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 4.
23.
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 19–24, 27. There are varying
explanations for the differences in the size of the federal lands grants to states over
time. Id. at 27. One potential explanation is that later states, such as Utah, Nevada,
Arizona, and New Mexico, were more arid and thus the land was less valuable,
which required the Federal land grant be larger to achieve the purposes of the grant.
Id. Another explanation is that western states gained more political power over time.
Id. In addition, land policy shifted over time. “The pattern adopted by most states
admitted to the Union before 1850 was to sell trust lands and give the money directly
to the schools. After 1850, many states retained ownership of trust lands as a stable
source of funding for their education institutions.” Tom Schultz & Tommy Butler,
Managing Montana’s Trust Lands, 41 MONT. BUS. Q., Winter 2003, at 1; see also
CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 9.
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plus Vermont, Tennessee, and Kentucky, joined the Union between 1785
and 1803 and did not receive any land grants upon becoming states.24
Between 1803 and 1858 fourteen additional states joined the Union, each
receiving section sixteen of every township as a common school grant
under the Northwest Ordinance of 1785.25 Between 1859 and 1890,
states began to receive double the amount of the original federal land
grant, receiving section thirty-six, in addition to section sixteen, of every
township as common school grants upon acceptance to the Union.26
Beginning in 1896, states began negotiating yet more generous federal
land grants.27 In 1896, the federal government granted Utah sections
sixteen, thirty-six, two, and thirty-two of every township.28 New Mexico
and Arizona also received these same four sections of each township.29

24.
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 19. These states, referred to
by Souder and Fairfax as phase-one states:
provide a basis of comparison with subsequent states, because no
federal land lay within their borders. Phase-one states had to
organize their own tax base to support schools and other public
functions.
In subsequent states, by contrast, the federal
government owned large tracts of land, and was called upon to
contribute to the development of public institutions.
Id.
25.
Id. at 19–22. These states included Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana,
Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, Arkansas, Michigan, Florida, Iowa,
Wisconsin, California, and Minnesota. Id. Two states, Maine and Texas, which
joined the Union during this time period, received no common school grant lands
from the federal government. See id. at 20–22. Texas included no federal public
domain lands because it was a former independent republic and thus received no
school land grants. Id. at 22.
26.
Id. at 20–23. The exception was West Virginia, which was
admitted in 1863 with no grant of lands from the federal government. Id. at 20.
States that received the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections of every township
included Oregon, Kansas, Nevada, Nebraska, Colorado, Montana, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Washington, Idaho, and Wyoming. Id. at 20–21.
27.
Id. at 20–23.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. Alaska and Hawaii, which joined the Union much later were
treated quite differently than other states. Id. at 23. For instance, Alaska’s statehood
bill allowed the State twenty-five years to choose 102.5 million acres of unreserved
land and fifty years to selection an additional 800,000 acres of national forest land.
Id. “The value of those selections rights was significantly reduced when state
selections were halted and both the federal government and the state’s Native
Americans moved to the front of the land-grab queue with almost 200 million acres
of selection rights, as a result of the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act.” Id. In
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There are varying explanations for the differences in the size of
the federal lands grants to states over time.30 One potential explanation
is that states admitted to the Union later, such as Utah, Nevada, Arizona,
and New Mexico, were more arid and thus the land was less valuable.31
Because sale or lease for agriculture was the primary use of the early
land grants, the western federal land grants needed to be larger to raise
funds comparable to the more fertile states.32 In short, the states in the
West required a larger quantity of land to produce the necessary revenue
to support schools and other public institutions.33 Another explanation is
that western states gained more political power over time.34
The federal land grant to Montana came in the middle of the
pack. In 1889, Montana was admitted to the Union as a part of a single
Omnibus Enabling Act, along with North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Washington.35 Through this Omnibus Enabling Act, Montana received
sections sixteen and thirty-six of every township “for the support of
common schools.”36 Today Montana retains approximately 90% of its
original land grant of five million acres.37
C. The Variety of Federal Land Grant Recipients
As discussed above, the amount of land granted by Congress
varied over time. Similarly, Congress’s grant of federal lands also varied
over time with regard to whom the lands were granted.38 Initially,
Congress took a township-centered approach, granting land to a township
for use by schools in that township.39 Some later lands were granted to
benefit schools in a township, but were directed to be managed by the
county.40 Later still, because some local townships abused their trust
responsibilities, Congress granted lands for the benefit of the schools in a
Hawaii, the statehood act ratified a trust on royal lands but it is not based on the
cadastral system of the lower forty-eight. Id. at 24.
30.
Id. at 27.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 9 (“[T]he organized
ranching, mineral, and timber industries that would eventually be able to utilize at
least some portion of these lands had not yet come to flower.”).
34.
Id.
35.
Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676.
36.
Id.
37.
CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 98.
38.
Id. at 7–8.
39.
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 29–30.
40.
Id. at 30.
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township but vested administration with the state.41 Lastly, Congress
granted the lands for the benefit of the schools in the state and provided
for state administration.42
Montana fell toward the later end of this progression. Montana’s
Omnibus Enabling Act granted sections sixteen and thirty-six in every
township to the State for the support of the common schools.43 As a
result, Montana was able to begin a school system with a centralized
source of funds.44
D. How Federal Land Grants Came to Be Viewed as a Trust – The Trend
Toward Uniformity
Given how common it is today to refer to federal land grants to
the states as “state school trust lands,” it may surprise some to learn that
“trust” in state school trust lands was not a specific requirement in early
enabling acts.45 Rather, the trust notion developed over time and indeed,
prior to 1910, the legal trust requirement came from each individual
state’s commitments in state constitutions, as opposed to individual
federal enabling acts.46
Prior to 1910, the exact language stating the purpose of each
federal land grant varied slightly, but significantly. For example, a
typical grant prior to 1860 granted the lands “for the maintenance of the
schools.”47 During the 1860s, the wording changed to “for the support of
common schools.”48 In 1907, the wording changed again when
Oklahoma was granted land “for the use and benefit of common
schools.”49 Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act actually used two
different phrases within the Act itself, granting lands “for the support of
common schools,” but also authorizing in lieu selections of excluded
41.
Id.; see also Schultz & Butler, supra note 23, at 2.
42.
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 30.
43.
Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, § 10, 25 Stat. 676, 679.
44.
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 30.
45.
See id. at 33–36.
46.
Sally K. Fairfax, Jon A. Souder & Gretta Goldenman, The School
Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom, 22 ENVTL. L. 797, 808 (1992);
see also SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 33. Note that case law, very early on,
established the notion of the land grants as a trust. See In re Powder River Drainage
Area, 702 P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985) (citing Trs. of Vincennes Univ. v. Indiana, 55 U.S.
268 (1852); Springfield Twp. v. Quick, 63 U.S. 56 (1895)).
47.
Fairfax, Souder & Goldenman, supra note 46, at 818.
48.
Id.
49.
Enabling Act of Oklahoma of 1906, Pub. L. No. 234, § 7, 34 Stat.
267, 272; see also Fairfax, Souder & Goldenman, supra note 46, at 818.
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mineral lands for the “use and benefit of the common schools.”50 By
contrast, no enabling act directly incorporated the use of the word “trust”
until the accession of Arizona and New Mexico to the Union in 1912.51
The Enabling Act of New Mexico and Arizona expressly provides that:
all lands hereby granted, including those which, having
been heretofore granted to the said Territory, are hereby
expressly transferred and confirmed to the said State,
shall be by the State held in trust . . . and that the natural
products and money proceeds of any of said lands shall
be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the
same.52
This Enabling Act also specified that the disposition of any lands,
money, or thing of value derived directly or indirectly from such lands
for any object other than that expressly granted or confirmed “shall be
deemed a breach of trust.”53
Prior to New Mexico and Arizona’s Enabling Act, states’
individual constitutions imposed a specific trustee relationship on their
own terms.54 For example, despite the lack of an explicitly imposed trust
relationship in the Omnibus Enabling Act, Montana’s 1889 Constitution
accepted that the federal grant of land would be “held in trust for the
people, to be disposed of as hereafter provided for the respective
purposes for which they have been or may be granted.”55 Montana’s
1972 Constitution continued those terms.56
Given the variety in the language of the grants and each state’s
unique incorporation of such grants into a state constitution, it is not
surprising that early case law often did not clearly recognize or cite to
trust principles. For example, in the 1920s and 1930s state courts did not
cite to either enabling acts or constitutional provisions to bar state
agencies from disposing of state school lands for diverse state purposes

50.
Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, §§ 10, 18, 25 Stat. 676,
679, 681–82.
51.
New Mexico and Arizona Enabling Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 219,
§§ 10, 28, 36 Stat. 557, 563, 574.
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
54.
See SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 33.
55.
MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XVII, § 1.
56.
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11; see also Dep’t of State Lands v.
Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948, 951 (Mont. 1985).
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not specifically benefitting the trust.57 Similarly, federal courts did not
find enabling acts or state constitutions an obstacle to an uncompensated
state grant of right-of-way across school lands for irrigation.58
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court, in Lassen v. Arizona
Highway Department,59 largely clarified the appropriateness of applying
trust principles when analyzing how states interpret the purpose of
federal land grants. In Lassen, the Supreme Court relied on the express
trust relationship established in the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act
to conclude that the State must “compensate the trust in money for the
full appraised value of any material sites or right of way which it obtains
on or over trust lands.”60 Soon, courts across the West embraced the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Lassen, regardless of the exact language of
the State’s enabling act and constitution.61 Thus, despite the relatively
unique trust-specific language contained in the New Mexico-Arizona
Enabling Act, the analysis in Lassen became the standard that defined the
trust responsibility.62 The Lassen analysis related to all state school
lands without import as to the unique nature of the New Mexico-Arizona
Enabling Act and other historical differences between the States.63 As a
result of courts applying Lassen, uniformity emerged in the interpretation
of state school land grants and the trust relationship, and the
responsibility established by such grants.64 One analysis of such cases
determined that “[j]udicial reliance on simplified versions of precedent
from other states is characteristic of the school lands cases in general,”
and is exacerbated by reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in
57.
See, e.g., Grosetta v. Choate, 75 P.2d 1031 (Ariz. 1938); see also
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 33.
58.
Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 502 (1923); see also SOUDER &
FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 33–34.
59.
Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
60.
Id. at 469.
61.
E.g., United States v. 78.61 Acres of Land in Dawes & Sioux
Cntys., 265 F. Supp. 564, 566 (1967) (noting the Nebraska Enabling Act “did not
contain the express restrictions which were incorporated in later, similar acts,” but
nevertheless determined that the “grant was undoubtedly in trust for a specific
purpose”); United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land in Ferry Cnty., 293 F. Supp. 1042
(E.D. Wash. 1968), aff’d 435 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding the State could not
donate school land to the federal government).
62.
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 34–36.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. (citing Cnty. of Skamania v. Washington, 685 P.2d 576 (Wash.
1984) (A recent case involving state school trust lands that shows an “admixture of
citations from diverse jurisdictions without adequate reference to differences in state
obligations, and the centrality of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions without apparent
awareness that importations from Arizona and New Mexico were occurring.”).
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Lassen, interpreting the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act as opposed
to the specific state law involved.65 The result is an eroding appreciation
of the differences in state accession bargains—one that often leaves the
impression that the federal land grants are trusts that are all virtually the
same.
III. MONTANA’S STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS – THE
IMPORTANCE OF MONTANA’S UNIQUE HISTORY AND TRUST
MANDATE
Regardless of the trend in uniformity in interpreting federal land
grants to states, it remains important to review and understand the
specific history of Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act, Constitution, and
statutory and administrative scheme to determine what the trust mandate
means for Montana’s beneficiaries and land managers.
A. Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act
As discussed above, in 1889, Montana, along with North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Washington,66 was admitted to the Union as a part of
a single Omnibus Enabling Act. Through this Omnibus Enabling Act,
Montana received sections sixteen and thirty-six of every township “for
the support of common schools.”67 In cases where sections sixteen and
thirty-six, or parts of these sections, had already been sold or otherwise
disposed of, the State was granted other equivalent lands known as “in
lieu” lands to be selected by the State in a manner provided by the
legislature with approval of the Secretary of Interior.68 The federal land
grant provided that these “in lieu” lands were also granted “for the
support of the common schools.”69 No lands that already had a federal
reservation were to be subject to the land grant, including any Indian or
military reservations.70
65.
Id. at 35–36.
66.
Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, 676 (“An act
to provide for the division of Dakota into two States and to enable the people of
North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington to form constitutions and
State governments and to be admitted to the Union on an equal footing with the
original States, and to make donations of public lands to such States.”).
67.
Id. § 10, 25 Stat. at 679.
68.
Id. The selection of “in lieu” lands by the State has yet to be
finalized over one century later.
69.
Id.
70.
Id. (“Provided, That the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections embraced
in permanent reservations for national purposes shall not, at any time, be subject to
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The land grant also specifically exempted from selection by the
State lands determined by the Department of Interior to be “mineral
lands.”71 Instead, the federal government authorized the State to pick
lands “in lieu” of such mineral lands “for the use and the benefit of the
common schools.”72 In 1927, however, the Jones Act retroactively
granted states, including Montana, sections that were “mineral in
character,” including mineral title to lands already granted, with limited
exceptions.73 The Jones Act grants came with restrictions.74 Under the
Act, Montana is prohibited from selling minerals and is limited to leasing
such minerals, “the proceeds and rentals and royalties therefrom to be
utilized for the support or in aid of the common or public schools.”75
Any minerals disposed of contrary to the Jones Act must be forfeited to
the United States.76
In addition to the grant of federal lands for the support of the
common schools, the Omnibus Enabling Act placed certain restrictions
on Montana’s disposal of such lands and required that proceeds of such
land sales constitute a permanent fund, “the interest of which only shall
be expended in the support of said schools.”77 The limits set out in the
Omnibus Enabling Act on the legislature’s ability to dispose of the

the grants nor to the indemnity provisions of this act, nor shall any lands embraced in
Indian, military, or other reservations of any character be subject to the grants or to
the indemnity provision of this act until the reservation shall have been extinguished
and such lands be restored to, and become a part of, the public domain.”). The story
of state land selection is much more complex than this provision of the Omnibus
Enabling Act implies. For a detailed history of state land selection in Montana, see
GEORGE WESLEY BURNETT, JR., MONTANA BECOMES A LANDLORD: A STUDY OF
STATE LAND SELECTION (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Oklahoma), available at https://shareok.org/bitstream/handle/11244/4222/7712732.
PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
71.
Omnibus Enabling Act, § 18, 25 Stat. at 681–82; see also CULP,
CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 11.
72.
Omnibus Enabling Act, § 18, 25 Stat. at 681–82.
73.
Jones Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 570, § 1, 44 Stat. 1026, 1026
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 870 (2012)) (“Subject to the provisions of subsections (a),
(b), and (c) of this section, the several grants to the States of numbered sections in
place for the support or in aid of common or public schools be, and they are hereby,
extended to embrace numbered school sections mineral in character, unless land has
been granted to and/or selected by and certified or approved, to any such State or
States as indemnity or in lieu of any land so granted by numbered sections.”); see
also CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 12.
74.
Jones Act of 1927, § 1, 44 Stat. at 1026.
75.
Id. § 1, 44 Stat. at 1026–27.
76.
Id. § 1, 44 Stat. at 1027.
77.
Omnibus Enabling Act, § 11, 25 Stat. at 679–80.
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school lands changed slightly over time.78 Initially, all lands granted for
educational purposes had to be disposed of at public sale for not less than
ten dollars per acre, and could be leased under regulations created by the
legislature for not more than five years.79 In 1932, Congress amended
the Omnibus Enabling Act to provide for more specific prices and lease
periods for different resources and agricultural products.80
The
amendment also provided that the State may, upon terms it prescribed,
grant easements and rights in the lands, and added that:
none of such lands, nor any estate or interest therein,
shall ever be disposed of except in pursuance of general
laws providing for such disposition, nor unless the full
market value of the estate or interest disposed of, to be
ascertained in such manner as may be provided by law,
has been paid or safely secured to the State.81
Any such disposition constituted “permanent funds for the support and
maintenance of the public schools.”82
B. Montana’s Constitutional and Statutory Trust Mandate
Montana’s trust mandate for school lands originated with
Montana’s 1889 Constitution.83 The 1889 Constitution accepted that the
federal grant of land would be “held in trust for the people, to be
disposed of as hereafter provided for the respective purposes for which
they have been or may be granted.”84 Montana’s 1972 Constitution
continued those terms.85 Specifically, Montana’s 1972 Constitution,
Article X, Section 11, provides, in relevant part:
Public land trust, disposition. (1) All lands of the state
that have been or may be granted by congress, or
78.
See, e.g., Act of May 7, 1932, Pub. L. No. 124, 47 Stat. 150,
amending Omnibus Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. § 1, 47 Stat. at 150.
81.
Id. § 1, 47 Stat. at 151.
82.
Id.
83.
MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XVII, § 1.
84.
Id.; see also MOON, supra note 4, at 13.
85.
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11; see also Dep’t of State Lands v.
Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948, 951 (Mont. 1985); Montanans for the Responsible Use of
the Sch. Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 989 P.2d 800, 803 (Mont.
1999).
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acquired by gift or grant or devise from any person or
corporation, shall be public lands of the state. They shall
be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as
hereafter provided, for the respective purposes for which
they have been or may be granted, donated or devised.
(2) No such land or any estate or interest therein shall
ever be disposed of except in pursuance of general laws
providing for such disposition, or until the full market
value of the estate or interest disposed of, to be
ascertained in such manner as may be provided by law,
has been paid or safely secured to the state.
(3) No land which the state holds by grant from the
United States which prescribes the manner of disposal
and minimum price shall be disposed of except in the
manner and for at least the price prescribed without the
consent of the United States.86
Montana’s legislature further expanded upon the trust mandate
found in Montana’s Constitution. For example, the legislature codified
restrictions on the State’s right to sell or transfer these lands: “All sales
of state lands shall be only at public auction held at the county
courthouse of the county in which the lands are located.”87 In addition,
the State is not allowed to sell valuable mineral lands,88 or state land
bordering on navigable lakes, non-navigable meander lakes, and
navigable streams.89
The State has other less known restrictions on school trust lands.
For instance, the Montana legislature has enacted express restrictions on
the management of state forest lands.90 Specifically:
The board and the [D]epartment [of Natural Resources
and Conservation] are prohibited from designating,
86.
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11 (emphasis original).
87.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-2-321 (2015); Act of May 7, 1932, Pub. L.
No. 124, 47 Stat. 150, amending Omnibus Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676.
88.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-2-303(1). This restriction on the sale of
valuable mineral deposits includes both the surface and mineral estate for lands that
are likely to contain coal, oil, oil shale, phosphate, metals, sodium, or “other
valuable mineral deposits,” but does not prohibit the sale of lands containing sand,
gravel, building stone, brick clay, or other similar materials. Id.
89.
Id. § 77-2-303(2)(3). This restriction excludes lands previously
leased as cabin sites and allows for the granting of easements and the leasing of such
lands. Id.
90.
Id. § 77-5-116.
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treating, or disposing of any interest in state forest lands
for the preservation or nonuse of these lands prior to
obtaining funds for the affected beneficiary equal to the
full market value of that designation, treatment, or
disposition. Unless the full market value of the property
interest or of the revenue foregone is obtained, the board
and the department are prohibited from either
temporarily or permanently designating, treating, or
disposing of any interest in any state forest lands for the
following purposes: (1) as a natural area pursuant to
Title 76, chapter 12, part 1, or as otherwise provided for
by law; (2) as open-space land as defined in 76-6-104;
(3) for old growth timber preservation; and (4) as a
wildlife management area.91
The State legislature has also included restrictions on the
exchange of state school trust lands.92 The land exchange may only
occur with specific listed entities.93 Moreover, the land received must be
of “equal or greater value, as determined by the [B]oard [of Land
Commissioners] after appraisal by a qualified land appraiser, than the
state land and as closely as possible equal in area.”94 In addition,
exchanges that involve state lands bordering navigable lakes and streams
or other bodies of water with significant public use value may be
exchanged for nongovernment-owned land only if it borders similar
navigable lakes, streams, or other bodies of water.95
Finally, the State’s Land Banking Program, which authorizes the
State to use the proceeds from the sale of state school trust lands to buy
other lands, also sets forth specific restrictions for the selection of land
banking parcels.96 Land banking is designed to improve the overall
returns to the trust and increase public access to state lands through the
sale of state lands that are predominantly isolated in nature, or not legally
91.
Id.
92.
Id. § 77-2-203.
93.
Id. (“Subject to subsection (2), the board is authorized to exchange
state land for land owned by: (a) the state or an agency of the state; (b) a political
subdivision of the state, including a county, city, town, public corporation, or district
created pursuant to state law; (c) any other public body of the state; or (d) a
nongovernmental entity, including but not limited to an individual, association,
partnership, or corporation.”).
94.
Id. § 77-2-203(2).
95.
Id. § 77-2-203(3); see also Skyline Sportsmen’s Ass’n v. Bd. of
Land Comm’rs, 951 P.2d 29 (Mont. 1997).
96.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-2-364.
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accessible.97 The State must realize the full market value of the land sold
through the program.98 In addition, when purchasing land, easements, or
improvements for existing trusts, specific appraisal and revenue
projection procedures must be used to ensure that the proposed purchase
is “likely to produce more net revenue for the affected trust than the
revenue that was produced from the land that was sold, among other
restrictions.”99
C. Montana’s Trust Administration: The Role of the State Board of Land
Commissioners and the Montana Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation
Besides establishing a trust relationship between the State and
various institutional beneficiaries, Montana’s Constitution addressed
arrangements for administration of the trust.100 Montana’s Constitution,
Article X, Section 4 states:
97.
Id.; see also Memorandum from Tom Schultz, Adm’r, Trust Land
Mgmt. Div., to EQC Agency Oversight Subcomm., DNRC Rulemaking 1 (Oct. 8,
2003), available at http://leg.mt.gov/content/committees/interim/2003_2004/
environmental_quality_council/subcommittees/agency_oversight/minutes/eqcao100
82003_ex12.pdf.
98.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-2-364(2).
99.
Id. § 77-2-364(4), (5) (“Prior to purchasing any land, easements, or
improvements, the board shall determine that the financial risks and benefits of the
purchase are prudent, financially productive investments that are consistent with the
board's fiduciary duty as a reasonably prudent trustee of a perpetual trust. For the
purposes of implementing 77-2-361 through 77-2-367, that duty requires the board
to: (a) discharge its duties with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence that a prudent
person acting in a similar capacity with the same resources and familiar with similar
matters should exercise in the conduct of an enterprise of similar character and aims;
(b) diversify the land holdings of each trust to minimize the risk of loss and
maximize the sustained rate of return; (c) discharge its duties and powers solely in
the interest of and for the benefit of the trust managed; (d) discharge its duties
subject to the fiduciary standards set forth in 72-38-801; and (e) maintain, as closely
as possible, the existing land base of each trust, consistent with the state's fiduciary
duty. (6) Prior to purchasing a parcel of land in excess of 160 acres in any particular
county, the board shall consult with the county commissioners of the county in
which the parcel is located.”).
100. See Fairfax, Souder & Goldenman, supra note 46, at 818.
Congressional enabling acts never required establishment of a commission or board
to administer the trust. Id. Rather, Oregon appears to be the first state to create a
land commission consisting of the governor, the secretary of state, and the state
treasurer. Id. Other states adopted the idea, but with variations. Id. Yet other states
rejected this idea, providing in constitutions that the legislature was responsible for
dealing with the school lands, including Washington and North Dakota, two states
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Board of land commissioners. The governor,
superintendent of public instruction, auditor, secretary of
state, and attorney general constitute the board of land
commissioners. It has the authority to direct, control,
lease, exchange, and sell school lands and lands which
have been or may be granted for the support and benefit
of the various state educational institutions, under such
regulations and restrictions as may be provided by
law.101
Montana’s legislature clarified the role of the Board of Land
Commissioners (“Board”) in Montana Code Annotated § 77-1-604.102
The Board exercises general authority, direction, and control over the
care, management, and disposition of state lands and, subject to the
investment authority of the Board of Investments, the funds arising from
the leasing, use, sale, and disposition of those lands or otherwise coming
under its administration.103 In its exercise of such authority, the Board is
guided by the general principle that state school trust lands and funds
“are held in trust for the support of education and for the attainment of
other worthy objects helpful to the well-being of the people of this state
as provided in The Enabling Act.”104 As such, “the Board shall
administer this trust to: (1) secure the largest measure of legitimate and
reasonable advantage to the state; and (2) provide for the long-term
financial support of education.”105
The Board is also required to manage state lands under the
multiple-use management concept.106 Multiple-use is:

under the Omnibus Enabling Act with Montana. Id.; see also MOON, supra note 4,
at 13.
101. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 4; see also MONT. CONST. of 1889, Art. XI,
§ 4 (emphasis original).
102. The Montana legislature has a general statement of policy with
regard to state trust lands that reads: “It is in the best interest and to the great
advantage of the state of Montana to seek the highest development of state-owned
lands in order that they might be placed to their highest and best use and thereby
derive greater revenue for the support of the common schools, the university system,
and other institutions benefiting therefrom, and that in so doing the economy of the
local community as well as the state is benefited as a result of the impact of such
development.” MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-1-604.
103. Id. § 77-1-202(1).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. § 77-1-203.
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defined as management of all the various resources of
the state lands so that: (a) they are utilized in that
combination best meeting the needs of the people and
the beneficiaries of the trust, making the most judicious
use of the land for some or all of those resources or
related services over areas large enough to provide
sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to
conform to changing needs and conditions and realizing
that some land may be used for less than all of the
resources; and (b) harmonious and coordinated
management of the various resources, each with the
other, will result without impairment of the productivity
of the land, with consideration being given to the relative
values of the various resources.107
Such multiple-use principles, however, do not negate or supersede the
trust mandate of Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act and Constitution.108
Under the direction of the Board, the Montana Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation (“DNRC”) “has charge of the
selecting, exchange, classification, appraisal, leasing, management, sale,
or other disposition of the state lands.”109 It is also required to perform
such “other duties the Board directs, the purpose of the department
demands, or the statutes require.”110 DNRC must also collect and receive
all monies payable to it through its office as fees, rentals, royalties,
interest, penalties, or payments on mortgages or land purchased from the
State or derived from any other source.111 Under direction of the Board,
DNRC is further responsible for selecting and locating lands granted to
Montana by the United States for any purpose, including the “in lieu”
lands.112
D. DNRC’s Administration of State School Trust Lands
DNRC is comprised of four distinct divisions: Forestry Division,
Water Resources Division, Conservation and Resource Development

107. Id. § 77-1-203(1).
108. See David Woodgerd & Bernard F. McCarthy, State School Trust
Lands and Oil and Gas Royalty Rates, 3 PUB. LAND L. REV. 119, 125 (1982).
109. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-1-301(1).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 77-1-301(2).
112. Id. § 77-1-304.
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Division, and Trust Land Management Division.113 The Trust Land
Management Division, as its name implies, administers and manages the
state trust surface and mineral resources for the benefit of the common
schools and other endowed institutions.114 It is first and foremost an
asset management organization.115 A brief description of each bureau
within the Trust Lands Management Division illustrates that although
historically managed for natural resource extraction, it has further
broadened its land-use activities to include other uses that may generate
greater revenue such as commercial, residential, industrial, renewable
energy, and conservation leasing.116
The Trust Lands Management Division consists of four separate
bureaus. First, the Agriculture and Grazing Management Bureau is
responsible for the leasing and management of agriculture and
rangelands.117 It manages approximately 9,000 agricultural and grazing
leases throughout the State. The Agriculture and Grazing Management
Bureau also oversees the recreational use program on state trust lands
and ensures compliance with the Montana Antiquities Act.118 Second,
the Forest Management Bureau manages over 780,000 acres of forested
state trust land.119 The Forest Management Bureau’s activities include
the sale of forest products and the Forest Improvement Program, which
uses fees from harvested timber to improve the health, productivity, and
value of forested trust lands.120 Third, the Minerals Management Bureau
is responsible for leasing, permitting, and managing approximately 1,876
oil and gas, metalliferous and non-metalliferous minerals, coal, and sand
and gravel agreements on over 750,000 acres of the available 6.2 million
mineral acres of school trust land and approximately 11,885 acres of
other state-owned land throughout Montana.121 As of 2016, the Minerals
Management Bureau manages 1,742 oil and gas leases and 35 coal
leases.122 Finally, the Real Estate Management Bureau manages all land

113. The Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation is administratively
attached to DNRC.
114. MONTANA DNRC TRUST LANDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION, ANNUAL
REPORT 1 (2016), available at http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/trust/docs/annualreport/fy-2016-trust-lands-annual-report.pdf [hereinafter DNRC ANNUAL REPORT].
115. Schultz & Butler, supra note 23, at 5.
116. Id.
117. DNRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 7.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Id. at 9–11.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Id.
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ownership transactions on trust land.123 This includes all permanent
dispositions and acquisitions of land, specifically the land banking
program, the cabin site sales program, and land exchanges.124 The Real
Estate Management Bureau also oversees the leasing program which
involves residential cabin and home-site leasing and the granting of
rights-of-way and easements.125 More recently, this Bureau developed a
strong commercial leasing program for development of state trust land,
consisting of mostly commercial ground leasing for retail development
and renewable energy.126
E. A Snapshot of Montana’s State School Trust Lands
Montana presently retains a vast majority of its original land
grant, over five million acres of school trust lands.127 “The original
common school grant in Montana was for 5,188,000 acres, with an
additional 668,720 acres granted for other endowed institutions.”128
Montana continues to hold the majority of its lands in the dispersed
pattern in which they were granted—section sixteen and thirty-six of
each township.129 The checkerboard pattern is typical for states that
retain school trust lands throughout the West and it brings significant
management challenges.130

123. Id. at 14.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id.
127. CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 98.
128. Schultz & Butler, supra note 23, at 4.
129. See DNRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 2 (map of Montana
Trust Lands showing dispersed pattern of ownership).
130. Fairfax, Souder & Goldenman, supra note 46, at 832. “Most
obviously, it is difficult to plan for and administer scattered parcels of land.” Id. In
addition, the “scattering of state-owned parcels means that state granted lands are
likely to be surrounded by neighbors—especially the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau
of Land Management—who operate under a significantly different management
mandate than the state, and who frequently do not share the state’s priorities.”

WILES PROOF (Do Not Delete)

2017

MONTANA’S STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS

9/24/2017 8:03 PM

169

DNRC manages lands held in trust under the original land grant
in the Omnibus Enabling Act for the common schools, but it also
manages other lands in trust for other institutions. For example, the
Omnibus Enabling Act and subsequent legislation granted acreage for
other educational and state institutions.131 Thus, DNRC manages all of
these lands in trust for their intended beneficiaries. The total acreage of
school trust lands fluctuates slightly each year due to land sales and
acquisitions.132 Mineral acreage for each trust generally exceeds surface
acreage because the mineral estate was retained when lands were sold.133
At the end of fiscal year 2016, the State held the following surface and
mineral acreages:

131. Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, §§ 12–17, 25 Stat. 676,
680–81 (public buildings at the capital, universities, penitentiary); DNRC ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 114, at 2 (map of Montana Trust Lands showing dispersed
pattern of ownership).
132. See DNRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 5 (map of Montana
Trust Lands showing dispersed pattern of ownership).
133. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-2-304 (2015).
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GRANT

ACREAGE

Common Public Schools

4,616,534 surface acres
5,596,963 mineral acres

University of Montana

17,262 surface acres
33,754 mineral acres

Montana State University
Morrill grant

63,474 surface acres
77,929 mineral acres

Montana State University
Second Grant

31,686 surface acres
46,598 mineral acres

Montana Tech University
of Montana

59,356 surface acres
86,267 mineral acres

State Normal School

63,217 surface acres
80,455 mineral acres

School for the Deaf & Blind

36,461 surface acres
41,171 mineral acres

State Reform School

67,295 surface acres
73,488 mineral acres

Veterans Home

1,417 surface acres
1,276 mineral acres

Public Buildings

184,656 surface acres
172,323 mineral acres

Acquired Lands

32,295 surface acres
0
mineral acres

Sir Trust134

2,600 surface acres
0
mineral acres
___________________
5,176,252 surface acres
6,210,224 mineral acres135

TOTALS

Vol. 38

134. Sir Trust is split equally between the School for the Deaf and Blind,
the Montana Development Center, and the Montana State Hospital. See DNRC
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 5 (map of Montana Trust Lands showing
dispersed pattern of ownership). This trust was acquired via a private donation and
thus did not originate with a Federal land grant.
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Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act requires that proceeds from
the sale and permanent disposition of any trust lands, or interest therein,
constitute permanent funds for the support and maintenance of public
schools and various state institutions for which the lands were granted.136
Montana’s Constitution requires that these permanent funds “shall
forever remain inviolate, guaranteed by the state against loss or
diversion.”137 At the end of fiscal year 2016, the permanent fund balance
was approximately $636.8 million.138 Total revenue for 2016 was $22.1
million.139 The 2016 revenue was down slightly from past years, due to
lower commodity market prices for beef, grain, and oil and gas. 140
Activities on state trust lands reduce the tax burden on Montana’s
taxpayers by paying an average of 10% of the yearly revenue needed to
fund K-12 schools in Montana.141 Unmistakably, DNRC’s management
of the school trust lands is a large scale operation with significant
impacts in Montana.
F. Current Market Conditions – Commercial Leasing Program
Currently an increasing demand exists for commercial
development of school trust lands located close to or within urban
settings.142 Therefore, DNRC is further developing its commercial
leasing program and increasing its number of commercial leases. In
2016, DNRC executed two new leases and signed three new Options to
Lease for potential commercial development, generating a total of
$47,500 in new annual revenues.143 At the end of 2016, there were 134
active commercial leases on state school trust lands and annual revenues
continue to grow each year.144

135. Id. at app., tbl.8.
136. See, e.g., Omnibus Enabling Act, § 11, 25 Stat. at 679–80.
137. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 3.
138. DNRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 17. The Common
Schools Permanent Fund balance was $585.7 million and the other beneficiaries’
Permanent Fund Balance was $51.1 million. Id.
139. Id. Revenue for the Common School Permanent Fund was $20.9
million and revenue for other beneficiaries’ Permanent Fund was $1.2 million. Id.
140. Id. at 7.
141. Schultz & Butler, supra note 23, at 5.
142. Commercial leases include all leases that are not agriculture,
grazing, or residential in nature. See DNRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 15.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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IV. CASE LAW: MONTANA COURTS ESTABLISH KEY TRUST
PRINCIPLES
Early on, Montana’s courts interpreted the requirements of
Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act as establishing a trust relationship
between the State as trustee and the public schools as beneficiaries.145
Once the basic principle was established, lawsuits initiated by taxpayers,
citizen actions groups, and, more recently, environmental groups, have
further clarified the meaning of Montana’s trust mandate.
A. Montana Courts Affirm the Trust Mandate
Montana courts have affirmed and interpreted the trust
relationship established in Montana’s Constitution. As early as 1896, in
State ex rel. Bickford v. Cook, the Montana Supreme Court held that the
grant of federal land in the Omnibus Enabling Act to Montana
constitutes a trust.146 The Court noted that its holding was in full accord
with a decision from the Washington Supreme Court, a state that was
granted lands under the same Omnibus Enabling Act as Montana.147 It is
clear, however, that the Court first relied upon its analysis of the granting
language in the Omnibus Enabling Act, and the acceptance by the State
of this grant as a trust in its Constitution, to reach its conclusion that the
grant of land to Montana was a trust.148
Other early cases followed suit. In 1913, the Court decided State
ex rel. Gravely v. Stewart, a case where the Board of Land
Commissioners refused to confirm a particular sale of school trust lands
to the highest bidder at auction because the Board determined the price
was inadequate and less than the real value of the land.149 The Court
upheld the Board’s cancelation of the sale stating:

145. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bickford v. Cook, 43 P. 928 (Mont. 1896).
146. Id. (“The fund created by the statute is a trust fund established by
law in pursuance of the act of congress. . . . The state cannot use the fund created by
this act for any purpose except as provided for by the act of congress. The state
officers have no control over it, except to carry out the trust relation.”). Other early
cases confirming the existence of the trust relationship included State ex rel. Dildine
v. Collins, 53 P. 1114 (Mont. 1898) and State ex rel. Koch v. Barret, 66 P. 504
(Mont. 1901). See also State ex rel. Gravely v. Stewart, 137 P. 854, 855 (Mont.
1913); Rider v. Cooney, 23 P.2d 261, 263, 305 (Mont. 1933).
147. Bickford, 43 P. 928.
148. Id.
149. Gravely, 137 P. at 854–55.
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The grant of lands for school purposes by the federal
government to this state constitutes a trust; and the state
board of land commissioners, as the instrumentality
created to administer that trust, is bound, upon principles
that are elementary, to so administer it as to secure the
largest measure of legitimate advantage to the
beneficiary of it.150
Not long after the Court decided Stewart, the United States
Supreme Court decided its first major case recognizing similar trust
principles. In Ervien v. United States, New Mexico’s land commissioner
sought to expend 3% of the income derived from New Mexico’s school
lands to advertise the resources and advantages of living in New Mexico
to settlers and investors.151 State officials rationalized that such an
expenditure was a legitimate expense in the administration of the trust
estate, which would result in increased demand for the lands and a
resulting increase in the proceeds to the beneficiaries.152 The Supreme
Court disagreed with the State, finding that such actions would be a
breach of trust.153 It held that New Mexico’s Enabling Act granted lands
to New Mexico for an exclusive purpose and the United States had a
right to the exact performance of the conditions it put on the land
grant.154
Thus, Montana’s courts recognized the trust relationship between
the State and the beneficiaries established by the Omnibus Enabling Act
and the United States Supreme Court held similarly when interpreting a
similar but later Enabling Act. For Montana, this recognition meant that
citizen initiated lawsuits were instigated to further define the application
of the trust mandate in Montana.

150. Id. at 855 (internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Rider, 23 P.2d 261;
Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land
Comm’rs, 989 P.2d 800, 803 (Mont. 1999).
151. Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41, 47 (1919). New Mexico’s
Enabling Act included specific language setting up a trust relationship between the
state and its beneficiaries, unlike the Omnibus Enabling Act for Montana. Enabling
Act of New Mexico and Arizona of 1910, Pub. L. No. 219, §§ 10, 28, 36 Stat. 557,
563, 574.
152. Ervien, 251 U.S. at 47.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 47–48.
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B. Early Citizen Challenges Define Key Trust Principles
Montana’s citizens’ challenges to state laws or the actions of the
State Board of Land Commissioners have generated the core case law
interpreting and defining Montana’s trust mandate.155 These include
cases initiated by taxpayers, citizens’ action groups, and environmental
groups, among others.
Through such actions, Montanans have
demonstrated the enforceability of previously defined trust principles and
further refined the nature of the trust.
In 1933, a Montana taxpayer filed an action against the officials
constituting the State Board of Land Commissioners and the
Commissioner of State Lands and Investments to enjoin the leasing of
state lands pursuant to a statute that set a minimum and maximum bid for
lease of state grazing lands.156 The taxpayer argued that the statute
allowed the Board to lease state lands at a much lower rental rate than it
had previously received and that these actions would result in lower
revenue for the public schools and an increased burden on state
taxpayers.157 It was in this case, Rider v. Cooney, that the Montana
Supreme Court first held that a lease is an “interest” in land and, under
the Omnibus Enabling Act, the State must obtain full market value for
the lease of state lands.158
Similarly, in 1938, a taxpayer filed lawsuit seeking an injunction
against the State Board of Land Commissioners to prevent the State from
entering into a pooling agreement covering state school trust lands in the
exploration of natural gas.159 In ruling against the taxpayer, the Court, in
Toomey v. State Board of Land Commissioners, reaffirmed the State was
a trustee and the trustee must strictly conform to the directions of the
155. Rider, 23 P.2d 261 (taxpayer challenge to State Board of Land
Commissioners lease of state grazing lands); Toomey v. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs,
81 P.2d 407 (1938) (taxpayer challenge to State Board of Land Commissioners use
of natural gas pooling agreements); State ex rel. Thompson v. Babcock, 409 P.2d
808, 809 (1966) (bidder of agricultural lease challenge to State Board of Land
Commissioner’s bid decision); Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust
v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 989 P.2d 800 (Mont. 1999) (citizen’s action
group challenge school trust land statutes); Montanans for the Responsible Use of
the Sch. Trust v. Darkenwald, 119 P.3d 27 (Mont. 2005) (citizen’s action group
challenge of certain other state school trust land statues); Friends of the Wild Swan
v. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Conservation, 127 P.3d 394 (Mont. 2005) (environmental
group challenge to Board’s methodology in evaluating timber sale transactions).
156. Rider, 23 P.2d at 262.
157. Id. at 263.
158. Id. at 265–66; see also In re Powder River Drainage Area, 702 P.2d
948, 952 (Mont. 1985).
159. Toomey, 81 P.2d at 409.
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trust agreement.160 Like the Court in Rider, the Toomey Court held that
leasing lands for a term of years was a disposal of an interest or estate in
lands and, thus, the Constitution required the State secure the full market
value of such an interest.161 The Court stated the “matter of primary
importance is the realization of the best price possible for the benefit of,
and to preserve, the permanent fund.”162 The Court determined the
Board had authority to enter into such pooling agreements and these
agreements fully protected the State’s rights in securing its full share of
the gas underlying its lands.163
State ex Rel. Thompson v. Babcock is another citizen initiated
case establishing key Montana trust principles. In 1966, a bidder on a
state agricultural lease sued the Board of Land Commissioners after the
Board awarded an agricultural lease of state trust lands to a former lessee
of the lands despite the new bidder’s higher crop-share bid.164 The Court
upheld the Board’s discretionary authority to accept lease terms less than
the highest bid to effectuate sustained yield concepts and ensure the
long-term strength of the permanent fund.165
C. Concerned Citizen Group Challenges: The Montrust Series
In the late 1990s, Montanans for the Responsible Use of the
School Trust (“Montrust”), a citizen’s action group, filed a series of three
lawsuits that brought attention to trust land management and further
clarified key trust principles in Montana.
1. Montrust I – Strict Interpretation of Trust Duties
In Montanans for the Responsible Use of the School Trust v.
State ex rel. Board of Land Commissioners (“Montrust I”),166 the plaintiff
Montrust alleged that fourteen separate state statutes relating to school
trust lands were unconstitutional because they were in violation of the
obligation of the State to obtain full market value for school trust
lands.167 The district court permanently enjoined eleven of the fourteen
160. Id. at 414.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 416.
163. Id. at 414–15.
164. State ex Rel. Thompson v. Babcock, 409 P.2d 808, 809 (1966).
165. Id. at 812; see also In re Powder River Drainage Area, 702 P.2d
948, 952 (Mont. 1985).
166. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust v. State ex rel.
Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 989 P.2d 800 (Mont 1999).
167. Id. at 802, 805.
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challenged statutes, and the parties appealed to the Montana Supreme
Court.168 In its opening discussion, the Court confirmed that the
language in the Omnibus Enabling Act, incorporated into Montana’s
Constitution, constituted a trust, for which the state was the trustee of
what it called “school trust lands.”169 It further confirmed that the Board
of Land Commissioners is the instrumentality created to administer the
trust.170 The Court reiterated that Montana’s Constitutional provisions on
trust land management limit the power of the legislature to dispose of
state lands and that one such limitation is the “trust’s requirement that
full market value be obtained for trust lands.”171 The Montrust I Court
then analyzed each of the challenged statutes to determine if they met
this constitutional requirement.172 This article will not address each of
the statutes analyzed, but several examples follow.
First, the Court considered a statute that authorized individuals
and counties to apply to DNRC for historic right-of-way deeds to provide
access to private property or to continue county roads.173 The statute set
the required fee for the right-of-way based on the median values for the
classifications of land (grazing, timber, crop, other) in 1972.174 Montrust
argued that by fixing the fair market values at 1972 levels, the statute
was unconstitutional because it violated the trust’s requirement to obtain
full market value for school trust lands.175 The Court agreed and held
that the statutory language, which gave DNRC no discretion and required
it to use the 1972 values, violated the constitutional trust requirement to
obtain full market value.176
Second, the Court held the State’s rental policy of charging 3.5%
of appraised value for cabin site leases, which resulted in below market

168. Id.
169. Id. at 803.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Act of May 7, 1932, Pub. L. No. 124, § 1, 47 Stat. 150,
151, amending Omnibus Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (providing that “none
of such lands . . . shall ever be disposed of . . . unless the full market value of the
estate or interest disposed of, to be ascertained in such manner as may be provided
by law, has been paid or safely secured to the State”)).
172. Id. at 804–12; MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-130 (2015).
173. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at
804.
174. Id. at 805.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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rate rentals, violated the trust’s requirement that full market value be
obtained for school trust lands and interests therein.177
Third, in similarly exacting fashion, the Court reviewed a statute
that authorized free permits for removal of dead, down, or inferior timber
for fuel and domestic purposes to state residents.178 Montrust alleged the
statute violated the State’s fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty because it
failed to distinguish between commercially valuable timber and timber
that lacked commercial value.179 Citing general trust law principles, the
Court again agreed with Montrust for two main reasons.180 First, it held
the statute violated the trust’s mandate to obtain full market value.
Second, the Court held the statute violated the State’s duty of undivided
loyalty to the trust when it failed to distinguish between commercially
valuable timber and timber that lacked commercial value because it
authorized the State to issue firewood permits to third parties without
charging them for any commercially valuable wood collected.181
Fourth, the Court reviewed a statute that allowed a former lessee
on agricultural lands up to sixty days to remove moveable improvements
from the state trust lands without any cost to the former lessee.182 The
Court determined that the statute violated the constitutional requirement
to obtain full market value because it allowed former lessees to remain
on trust lands free of charge and authorized DNRC’s practice to postpone
new leases without compensation to the trust while the former lessee
exercised their removal rights.183 The statute thus denied the trust’s
beneficiaries of the full benefit of the trust lands and violated the duty of
undivided loyalty by benefiting a third party to the detriment of the
beneficiaries.184
Finally, the Court reviewed a statute that required new
agricultural or grazing lessees to show that they paid former lessees the
value of their improvements before DNRC would issue leases.185
Montrust argued this statute violated the fiduciary duty of loyalty by
177. Id. at 806; MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-1-208. This did not apply to the
relevant statute on its face, which the Court determined to be constitutional.
178. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at
808; MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-5-211.
179. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at
808.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-6-304.
183. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at
809 (citing Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458, 468 (1967)).
184. Id.
185. Id.; MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-6-305.
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delaying the leasing of state trust lands for the benefit of someone other
than the trust’s beneficiaries.186 The State conceded that delay in leasing
may occur but argued that such provisions were part of the Board of
Land Commissioners’ large discretionary power over trust lands, and
was necessary to eliminate needless complications in determining the
value of improvements.187 The Court acknowledged the Board’s large
discretionary power, but stated “this discretion is not unlimited but must
conform to the requirements of the trust.”188 The Court determined that
allowing state trust lands to stand idle indefinitely while former and new
lessees determine the value of improvements was “inconsistent with the
trust’s mandate that full market value be obtained for school trust lands,”
and thus unconstitutional.189
Upon review of the Court’s determination and analysis relating
to each statute involved, it is safe to state that the Montana Supreme
Court will strictly interpret the State’s trust mandate. The next case in
the Montrust series, Montanans for the Responsible Use of the School
Trust v. Darkenwald (“Montrust II”), further clarified the boundaries of
Montana’s trust mandate and recognized the State Board of Land
Commissioners’ large amount of discretion in carrying out the terms of
the trust.190
2. Montrust II – Clarifying The Board of Land Commissioners’
Discretion
Montrust II involved an allegation by Montrust that the Board of
Land Commissioners breached its trust duties under the Montana
Constitution and Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act by commingling the
interest earned on certain school trust assets into the State’s General
Fund without earmarking or accounting for it.191 Montrust also alleged
the State’s sale of a 30-year future stream of mineral royalties from
school trust land in exchange for an immediate cash infusion violated the

186.

Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at

810.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing Toomey v. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 81 P.2d 407, 414
(1938); State ex rel. Thompson v. Babcock, 409 P.2d 808, 809, 811 (1966)).
189. Id.
190. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust v.
Darkenwald, 119 P.3d 27 (Mont. 2005).
191. Id. at 30–33.
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State’s trust duties.192 The district court ruled in favor of the State
finding no violations of the State’s trust duties.193 The Montana Supreme
Court affirmed.194
In affirming the district court, the Court began by reaffirming,
rather than fully restating, the State’s trust duties as described in
Montrust I.195 The Court next reviewed Montrust’s contention regarding
the commingling of funds.196 It stated that, in accordance with general
trust law, the State’s duty as a trustee required “it to be able to prove that
the information in the accounting is sufficiently accurate and complete to
enable the beneficiaries to protect and defend the equitable or beneficial
amount.”197 The Court determined that the State had met this burden
because it had accounted for the exact amount of interest and bonuses
deposited into the General Fund and the amount of the legislative
appropriation from the General Fund to public schools, which far
exceeded any interest or bonuses derived from the trust corpus.198
Montrust also failed to allege any particular accounting practice
depriving public schools of their distributable income or that the State
somehow diverted income away from public schools to non-trust
purposes.199 As a result, the Court determined that Montrust failed to
prove any financial harm or breach of trust.200 The Court further
determined that, under such circumstances, the commingling of funds did
not constitute a breach of trust per se simply by virtue of the trust’s
existence.201
The Court next reviewed a State statute allowing the State to sell
a thirty-year future stream of mineral royalties from school trust land in
exchange for an immediate cash infusion.202 Montrust argued that the
192. Id. The general fund is the common fund into which the State
deposits all revenues unless the Legislature specifically designates that revenues be
deposited into a different account. Id. at 31.
193. Id. at 33.
194. Id. at 41.
195. Id. at 33.
196. Id. at 33–35.
197. Id. at 34.
198. Id. at 34–35.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 35.
202. Id. at 35–41. The statute authorized DNRC to borrow up to $75
million from the coal trust severance tax permanent fund for thirty years to buy
mineral production royalties owned by the school trust to enhance the short-term
distributable revenue from the permanent fund for the benefit of public schools. Id.
at 31. The State deposits the loan amount into the permanent fund to increase the
amount of distributed revenue to beneficiaries and then dedicates the future stream
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future stream of mineral royalties should be viewed as a sale of the
school trust lands that cannot be disposed of pursuant to Montana’s
Constitution and Section 11 of Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act.203
The Montana Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the State did not
dispose of any permanent interest in land, “rather, [the State] has
exercised its discretion to enter into a loan agreement to exploit mineral
production—an agreement for which it received full market value.”204
The Court held that the statute itself did not facially violate the trust
because nothing in the plain language abrogated the trust’s mandate to
obtain full market value for school trust lands.205 The Court further held
that the State’s method of determining full market value was proper and
did not breach the State’s trust duty.206
Next, Montrust alleged the State violated Section 11 of the
Omnibus Enabling Act when it failed to perform independent appraisals
to determine full market value of the future stream of mineral
royalties.207 Here, the Court determined that the method of establishing
value was not a breach of trust because the Board had the power to
determine the method by which to ascertain full market value.208 The
Court acknowledged the Board’s duty to ensure the trust receives full
market value from the sale or disposal of any interest or estate in school
trust land, but stated that “[o]n this matter we will not substitute our
opinion for the Land Board’s opinion and we will not control the
discretion of the board unless it appears that the action of the board is
of mineral royalties to servicing the loan over a thirty-year period. Id. at 36. The
State also distributes any surplus cash flow to the trust beneficiaries. Id. Once the
state repays the loan, it would again deposit future royalties directly into the
permanent fund. Id.
203. Id. at 36.
204. Id. (citing Hughes v. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 353 P.2d 331, 336
(Mont. 1960) (upholding a statute authorizing the Land Board to lease state lands for
underground storage of natural gas); Rist v. Toole Cnty., 159 P.2d 340, 342 (Mont.
1945) (Royalty means a share of the produce or profit paid to the owner of property,
which is different from a share or interest in the property itself.); Toomey v. State
Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 81 P.2d 407, 414 (1938) (Land Board’s authority to enter into
a pooling agreement with private parties is well within the Board’s discretion as it
constitutes one of the types of arrangements whereby oil and gas possibilities may be
exploited pursuant to § 11 of the Omnibus Enabling Act.)).
205. Darkenwald, 119 P.3d at 37.
206. Id. at 37–38.
207. Id. at 38.
208. Id. (citing Hughes, 353 P.2d at 338–39 (internal quotations omitted)
(upholding the State’s determination of full market value using a computation of the
present value of the royalty interest of the State based upon the number of cubic feet
of recoverable gas remaining in the ground)).
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arbitrarily and, in effect, fraudulent.”209 The Court, however, cautioned
the State that an independent appraisal represents the most reliable
method of ensuring that the trust receives full market value.210 The Court
also noted that it would not hesitate to overturn a transaction in which the
State did not receive full market value.211
Montrust further alleged that the distribution of the future stream
of mineral royalties improperly favored present beneficiaries to the
detriment of future beneficiaries in violation of the State’s trust duties.212
The Court distinguished Montrust I, because the State in Montrust I had
breached its duty of undivided loyalty by providing trust assets to thirdparties for less than full market value.213 The Court held that the
“trustees enjoy far broader discretion in this context than the limited
discretion afforded in the breach of duty of undivided loyalty situation
described in Montrust I.”214 The Court determined that the Land Board
considered its duty to current and future beneficiaries and concluded that
the particular distribution helped both.215
It stated, “Montrust’s
disagreement with the Land Board over its policy of shifting some
income from long-term to short-term beneficiaries provides an
insufficient basis upon which to overturn its decision, particularly where
the transaction does not deplete the permanent fund, but only causes it to
grow at a slower rate.”216 In short, the Court determined that the State
did not violate its trust duties through its sale of the future stream of
mineral royalties.217
The next case in the Montrust series, Montrust III, alleged
violations of the State’s fiduciary duties relating to its cabin site leasing
program. The parties reached a settlement, however, and therefore the

209. Id. at 38 (internal quotation omitted).
210. Id. at 34
211. Id. at 38.
212. Id. at 39.
213. Id.
214. Id. (citing State ex rel. Thompson v. Babcock, 409 P.2d 808 (1966)
(accepting “the Land Board’s discretionary authority to accept lease terms less than
the highest bid in order to effectuate sustained yield concepts and ensure land-term
strength of the trust corpus”). The Court also noted that other jurisdictions have
upheld regulations that, in effect, constrained the ability of present beneficiaries
from exploiting resources on school trust lands, which in effect favored future
beneficiaries. Id. (citing Colo. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs v. Colo. Mined Land
Reclamation Bd., 809 P.2d 974, 985 (Colo. 1991); Nat’l Parks and Conservation
Assoc. v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 923 (Utah 1993)).
215. Id. at 40–41.
216. Id. at 41.
217. Id.
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case did not result in a court decision. Despite the lack of a final court
decision, the case remains relevant to examining the State’s trust
responsibilities.
3. Montrust III – Settlement Based on Established Full Market Value
Principles
In 2012, Montrust initiated a third lawsuit against the State,
referred to as Montrust III.218 In Montrust III, Montrust alleged that a
2011 statute, and its implementing administrative rules, violated the
State’s fiduciary, trust, and Constitutional duties, because it set certain
fee calculation methods and directed DNRC to conduct a bidding process
for currently vacant cabin site lots with an initial minimum bid of 2% of
the appraised value of the lot. Montrust argued this failed to secure for
the trust a full market value rate of return.219 The parties settled the
litigation, agreeing to a permanent injunction of the challenged statute
and associated rules.220 Thus, Montrust III did not directly create new
case law relating to Montana’s trust principles. The settlement
demonstrates, however, that the State understands its obligation to obtain
full market value for leases.
The settlement agreement required the State to administer cabin
site lease rates under its terms and administrative rules created to
implement those terms. Specifically, under the terms of the settlement
the State agreed to offer all vacant cabin site leases for competitive bid at
a minimum rate of 6.5% of the appraised value of the lot, which rate
could be reduced to 5% if bids were not received within sixty days.221 In
a neighborhood where vacancy rates are higher than 30%, DNRC is
allowed to offer the leases at less than 5%, but not less than 3.5% of the
apprised land value or $800.00 per year, whichever is higher.222 The
State also must also renew all existing leases at a rate of no less than 5%
of the appraised land value or $800.00, whichever is greater.223 In
218. See Decision and Final Judgment On Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust v.
Montana (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Nov. 10, 2015) (No. 2012-39); see also Montrust
III Settlement Agreement, Frequently Asked Questions, DNRC (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/trust/docs/real-estate-management/Cabin%20Site%20
Lease%20-%20Information%20Docs/miii-faq-for-mailing-november-9-2015.pdf.
219. Decision and Final Judgment On Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 218, at 5–6.
220. Id. at 7.
221. Id. at 8.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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addition, every two years the Land Board must review the data from all
cabin site leases and complete a formal review by an economist to
consider whether to revise the rates.224 Finally, the Land Board
committed “to setting the rental rates for cabin site leases so as [to]
capture for the trust beneficiaries the full market value of such leases in
order to maximize the cumulative long-term revenue from cabin sites
without creating vacancy rates that are detrimental to the best financial
interest of the trust beneficiaries, as required by the Montana
Constitution and Enabling Act.”225 In sum, the Montrust series of cases
brought a new focus to trust land management in Montana. These cases
also served to clarify key principles of trust land management.
D. Montana Supreme Court Further Refines Key Trust Principles
In 2003, Friends of the Wild Swan, an environmental advocacy
organization, challenged the Board of Land Commissioners’
methodology in evaluating timber sale transactions, claiming the Board
was required under its powers and duties as a trustee to make a harvestspecific accounting of State timber sales.226 Specifically, Friends of the
Wild Swan argued that without the harvest-specific accounting, the
Board’s requirement pursuant to Montana Code Annotated § 77-1-202,
to “secure the largest measure of legitimate and reasonable advantage to
the state” was meaningless.227 The Board had approved the timber sale
at issue in the summer of 2003 without a harvest-level accounting
because it specifically evaluated costs and benefits at the programmatic,
or year-end, level only.228
The Montana Supreme Court held that the harvest-level
accounting of proposed timber sales was not required by law.229 The
Court noted the additional information may be advantageous and would
undoubtedly help the Board in its evaluation of the timber sales.230 The
question was not whether such accounting would be preferable or
desirable, but whether it was required by law.231 The Court examined the
Board’s broad, but not unlimited, discretion over the administration of
224. Id. at 9.
225. Id. In addition, attorney’s fees were awarded to both Montrust and
the Board of Regents of Higher Education. Id.
226. Friends of the Wild Swan v. Dep’t. of Natural Res. & Conservation,
127 P.3d 394, 396 (Mont. 2005).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 400.
230. Id. at 399.
231. Id. at 400.

WILES PROOF (Do Not Delete)

184

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

9/24/2017 8:03 PM

Vol. 38

school trust lands.232 The Court stated, “it is clear that the Board’s
obligation as trustee is a complex one, that the obligation is governed by
constitutional and statutory provisions which grant authority to the Board
over the trust, and that these provisions grant ‘large’ or ‘considerable’
discretion to the Board in the performance of its duties.”233 In addition,
the Court stated that the Board’s status as a state agency also entitled it to
respectful consideration of its long and continued course of consistent
interpretation, which could only be overcome by “compelling
indications.”234 The Court determined no evidence existed that the Board
could not secure the largest measure of benefit without the harvest-level
accounting of timber sales.235 Given the discretion afforded to the Board
in the administration of the trust and as a state agency, the Court could
not conclude that the harvest-specific accounting requirement was
required by Montana Code Annotated § 77-1-202.236
E. Brief Summary of Montana’s Trust Mandate and Key Principles
After over a century of case law establishing, interpreting, and
refining Montana’s constitutional trust mandate, three key principles
have emerged. The first is that the State, as a trustee, has a fiduciary
duty to the beneficiaries of the trust. The trust must be administered to
secure the largest measure of legitimate and reasonable advantage to the
State while at the same time providing for the long-term financial
support of education.237 In doing so, the State must receive full market
value for the disposition of any estate or interest in school trust lands.238
Specifically, according to a Montana Attorney General Opinion, the
State must “actually compensate its school trust in money” for the full
market value of its lands or interest therein.239
232. Id. at 397.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 399.
236. Id.
237. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-1-202 (2015); State ex rel. Gravely v.
Stewart, 137 P. 854, 855 (Mont. 1913) (internal citations omitted); see also Rider v.
Cooney, 23 P.2d 261, 265–66 (Mont. 1933); Montanans for the Responsible Use of
the Sch. Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 989 P.2d 800, 803 (Mont 1999).
238. Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, § 11, 25 Stat. 676, 679–80;
Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at 805–06.
239. See Mont. Att’y Gen. Op. 2, 36 Op. Att’y Gen. 287 (1976); see also
Woodgerd & McCarthy, supra note 108, at 125–26 (“In 1976, Montana Attorney
General Robert Woodahl, at the request of the Acting Commissioner of State Lands,
issued an opinion concerning the Montana Natural Areas Act of 1974. The opinion
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The second key principle is that the State, as a trustee, owes a
duty of undivided loyalty to the trust beneficiaries.240 This duty of
undivided loyalty “is jealously insisted on by the courts which require a
standard with a ‘punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.’”241 Indeed,
“[a] trustee must act with the utmost good faith toward the beneficiary,
and may not act in his own interest, or in the interest of a third
person.”242 In addition, the State may not advantage one beneficiary over
another, but must deal impartially with them.243
And finally, in carrying out its role as trust administrator, the
Board is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions that grant it
considerable discretion in the performance of its duties.244 A court will
not control this discretion unless it is arbitrary and, in effect,
fraudulent.245 The Board’s discretion is limited by the requirements of
the trust including Montana’s constitutional requirement that the State
obtain full market value for the disposition of any estate or interest in
school trust land.246 Yet, the Board may have the discretion to accept
less than the highest bid for an interest in land to effectuate sustained
stated: So that the state will not commit a breach of trust under the Omnibus
Enabling Act and Montana Constitution, the state must actually compensate its
school trust in money for the full appraised value of any school trust lands
designated as or exchanged for natural areas pursuant to the Montana Natural Areas
Act of 1974. Such compensation can only be avoided by securing the consent of
Congress.”).
240. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at
808–10.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 808 (citing Wild W. Motors, Inc. v. Lingle, 728 P.2d 412,
415–16 (Mont. 1986)).
243. See Montanans for Responsible Sch. Trust v. State, No. 97-134,
1998 Mont. Dist. Lexis 730, at *7 (Apr. 1, 1998) (“[T]he State may not provide
favoritism to some beneficiaries if such conduct does not benefit the trust as a
whole.”).
244. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust v.
Darkenwald, 119 P.3d 27, 36 (Mont. 2005); Friends of the Wild Swan v. Dep’t. of
Natural Res. & Conservation, 127 P.3d 394, 397 (Mont. 2005); State ex rel.
Thompson v. Babcock, 409 P.2d 808, 811 (1966) (“The State Board of Land
Commissioners has considerable discretionary power . . . . If the ‘largest measure of
legitimate and reasonable advantage’ from the use of state lands is to accrue to the
state, then the State Land Board must, necessarily, have a large discretionary
power,” which is “inherent in the general and discretionary powers conferred by the
constitution, and necessary for the proper discharge of its duties.”).
245. Darkenwald, 119 P.3d at 38.
246. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at
810; Babcock, 409 P.2d at 811; Toomey v. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 81 P.2d 407,
414 (1938).
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yield concepts and ensure the long-term strength of the permanent
fund.247
V. CONCLUSION
Montana’s state school trust lands have a unique history and
legal framework. Montana’s courts interpret Montana’s Omnibus
Enabling Act, Constitution, and statutory framework to define the trust
relationship and principles under which state school trust lands are
managed. The management of school trust lands, as well as the income
derived from such lands is, and will remain, immensely important to
Montana.

247. See Babcock, 409 P.2d at 812; see also In re Powder River Drainage
Area, 702 P.2d 948, 952 (Mont. 1985).

